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Comments on Child Abuse Litigation in a "Testimonial"




I agree with many of the conclusions reached by Professors Mosteller and Lyon2 in
their significant articles concerning children caught in a testimonial world. These
comments will give my perspective on a number of the issues that they have raised.
Child abuse cases are difficult for prosecutors to win because the abuse takes place
in secret, and no physical evidence of molestation may be present either because of the
nature of the abuse or because children heal quickly and the crime is often reported
well after it occurred. The fact that children disclose in stages also increases the
likelihood of inconsistencies in their descriptions of the abuse. Questioning by a family
member, doctor, psychologist, or police officer may also be perceived as leading,
resulting in unreliable answers. Moreover, children often recant their accusations.
Thus, their statements are viewed skeptically by jurors because of concerns about their
susceptibility to suggestion, manipulation, coaching, or confusing fact with fantasy,
whether or not they testify. In practice, hearsay is a dominant feature of child abuse
litigation, primarily introduced in the context of excited utterances, statements for
medical diagnosis or treatment, forensic interviews, or via ad hoc exceptions.3 Even
pre-Crawfordv. Washington,4 reversals based on the admission of child hearsay were
more frequent than hearsay reversals in other types of cases.5 However, Crawford and
Davis v. Washington6 up the ante for prosecutors who are trying to protect vulnerable
young children who are unable or unwilling to testify at trial, because they defeat the
admission of testimonial statements, including the highly regarded best practice of
videotaping multidisciplinary forensic interviews.7
It should come as no surprise that eighteenth-century values would silence the
voices of children in the twenty-first-century courtroom.8 The trouble with a
* Professor, Southwestern Law School.
1. Robert P. Mosteller, Testing the Testimonial Concept and Exceptions to Confrontation:
"A Little Child Shall Lead Them, "82 IND. L.J. 917 (2007) [hereinafter Mosteller, A Little Child
Shall Lead Them].
2. Thomas D. Lyon & Raymond LaMagna, The History of Children's Hearsay: From Old
Bailey to Post-Davis, 82 IND. L.J. 1029 (2007) [hereinafter Lyon & LaMagna, History of
Children's Hearsay].
3. See, e.g., TASK FORCE ON CHILD WITNESSES, AM. BAR Ass'N CRIM. JUST. SEC., THE
CHILD WITNESS IN CRIMINAL CASES 40-42 (2002).
4. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
5. John E.B. Myers, Ingrid Cordon, Simona Ghetti & Gail S. Goodman, Hearsay
Exceptions: Adjusting the Ratio of Intuition to Psychological Science, 65 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 3, 44-45 (2002) [hereinafter Hearsay Exceptions].
6. 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 105-117; see generally Mosteller, A Little Child
Shall Lead Them, supra note 1.
8. See generally Myrna S. Raeder, Remember the Ladies and Children Too: The Impact of
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testimonial approach grounded in 1791 is the rarity of child abuse cases in that time
frame, coupled with the view that children should not be presumed competent until
they reached ages ranging from seven to twelve years old. Generally, restrictive
evidentiary rules excluded most modem hearsay from being heard by jurors of the
period, who one should remember would not have included women, blacks, servants,
non-taxpayers, or non-land holders.9 Thus, relying on an approach that did not consider
the unique issues concerning child testimony or the total shift in community values and
evidentiary practices is a recipe for the exclusion of children's voices, despite some
prosecutors' wishful thinking that young children can never utter testimonial statements
because an objective standard would always exclude them due to their developmental
inability to understand how trials work and the role witnesses play in creating
testimony. 10
Moreover, Justice Scalia's interpretation of the standards for admissible criminal
evidence at the time of the framing' 1 has been dramatically challenged.12 For example,
Professor Davies, a legal historian, disputes that several key English cases cited in
Crawford would have been available to the Framers when they were drafting the Bill of
Rights. 13 Even Justice Scalia apparently abandoned Crawford's rigid originalist
approach when he noted in Davis that "[r]estricting the Confrontation Clause to the
precise forms against which it was originally directed is a recipe for its extinction.'"
Generally, the testimonial approach appears to exalt cross-examination for a limited
category of statements, while viewing it as constitutionally unnecessary for everything
else, which in a world of expansive modem statutory hearsay exceptions seems to
promote the wrong message. In other words, cross-examination and live witnesses are
not essential for a fair trial, unless the defendant has the good luck of facing a
testimonial statement. Ironically, this framework ignores the fact that most
nontestimonial hearsay would not be admitted today, but for the governmental action
of sponsoring and adopting broad exceptions, which did not exist in 1791, to admit
statements of all manner of private individuals including medical personnel.
The testimonial approach not only disadvantages defendants facing nontestimonial
hearsay, but also the government, which has no way of overcoming a testimonial
Crawford on Domestic Violence and Child Abuse Cases, 71 BROOK. L. REv. 311 (2005)
[hereinafter Remember the Ladies].
9. See, e.g., William E. Nelson, The Eighteenth-Century Background ofJohn Marshall's
Constitutional Jurisprudence, 76 MICH. L. REv. 893, 919 (1978).
10. See, e.g., Allie Phillips, Child Forensic Interviews after Crawford v. Washington:
Testimonial or Not?, 39 PROSECUTOR 17, 21 (Aug. 2005) (arguing for a reasonable child
standard and rejecting an objective person standard for children under the age often).
11. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,43-51 (2004).
12. See, e.g., Thomas Y. Davies, Not the Framers' Design: How the Framing-Era Ban
Against Hearsay Evidence Refutes the Crawford-Davis "Testimonial" Formulation of the Scope
of the Original Confrontation Clause, 15 BROOK. J.L. & POL'Y (forthcoming 2007); Randolph
N. Jonakait, The (Futile) Search for a Common Law Right of Confrontation: BeyondBrasier's
Irrelevance to (Perhaps) Relevant American Cases, 15 BROOK. J. L. & POL'Y (forthcoming
2007); Randolph N. Jonakait, The Too-Easy Historical Assumptions of Crawford v.
Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REv. 219 (2005); Mosteller, A Little Child Shall Lead Them, supra
note 1.
13. See Thomas Y. Davies, What Did the Framers Know, and When Did They Know It?
Fictional Originalism in Crawford v. Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REv. 105, 156-62 (2005).
14. Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2278 n.5 (2006).
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statement when the declarant is unavailable to testify, despite any lack of negligence or
wrongdoing on its part, or its inability to duplicate the statement through other
witnesses, even when the statement is critical to its case. While the impetus for the
testimonial approach was to prohibit the admission of declarations against interest
given by cohorts and accomplices to law enforcement, a conclusion I completely agree
with, other formulations of confrontation doctrine including Ohio v. Roberts's could
have reached this result without totally eliminating the introduction of other testimonial
statements when the declarant does not testify. Indeed, if this strict originalist approach
were applied to other constitutional guarantees it would likely strip away many of the
rights criminal defendants now enj oy. 16 However, the testimonial world is not likely to
disappear anytime soon, given the Court's near unanimity in adopting it. Thus, the
pragmatic question is how to apply Crawford and Davis in a way that neither cripples
child abuse prosecutions, nor eviscerates the ability of defendants to obtain a fair trial
with live witnesses who are subject to cross-examination.
I. REFERENCES TO CHiLD ABUSE CASES IN CRA WFORD AND DAvis
So far, while neither case specifically addressed the testimony of children, several
oblique references appear to discount the wholesale rendering of child statements as
nontestimonial. For example, the only case questioned by Crawford was White v.
Illinois,1 7 in which some of the admitted hearsay included a child's statement to a
police officer.' 8 Only if statements of children could be testimonial would this
reference make sense.19 Similarly, Crawford did not challenge the holding in Idaho v.
Wright,20 which excluded child testimony under the Roberts reliability standard as
being untrustworthy.
Davis seemingly approved King v. Brasier,21 which while subject to multiple
meanings, appears to reject child hearsay repeated by a mother in court.22 Professor
Mosteller's thoughtful and meticulously researched article in this Symposium debunks
the historic approach to confrontation by its vivid portrayal of the difficulty of relying
on early cases that are reported differently by varied sources, with potentially
conflicting explanations and results.23 My own view is that Brasier does no more than
confirm that an incompetent child's hearsay cannot be introduced because the child
could not be a witness at trial. Unlike others, I am not troubled by an approach that
accepts that there is no justification for admitting the out-of-court statement of
15. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
16. See, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, Sixth-Amendment Originalism 's Collision Course with the
Right to Counsel: What's Titanic, What's Iceberg? 35 (San Diego Legal Stud. Res. Paper
Series, Paper No. 07-79, 2006), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstract
id=952508.
17. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 58 n.8 (2004) (discussing White v. Illinois, 502
U.S. 346 (1992)).
18. White, 502 U.S. at 351, 357.
19. See Commonwealth v. DeOliveira, 849 N.E.2d 218, 226 n.10 (Mass. 2006).
20. 497 U.S. 805 (1990).
21. (1779) 1 Leach 199, 168 Eng. Rep. 202 (K.B.).
22. See Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2277 (2006).
23. See Mosteller, A Little Child Shall Lead Them, supra note 1, at 923-33.
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someone who could not testify to the same words at trial. Indeed, I think this is one of
the reasons that so much child hearsay has been funneled into the excited utterance
exception. Since the stress of the event is deemed to defeat the ability to lie, we need
not rely on whether the individual child is competent because the general ability to
discern and tell the truth is not at issue. Similarly, many courts recognize that
statements introduced under medical exceptions are only admissible if the child
understands the negative consequences of giving medical personnel false information,
24
a concept intertwined with truthfulness.
However, I reject the easy suggestion that all child hearsay is admissible because
children do not understand the trial process until well after the age that they would
typically be found to be competent. Such a view would only be feasible if Wright were
overruled, which has not occurred. While the Court has assiduously avoided any
mention of Wright in Crawford and Davis, I do not agree with Professor Mosteller's
predication that its fate has already been sealed. Several possible alternatives exist. The
most likely is that Wright will be cabined by recharacterizing it as a case involving a
police proxy or agent who engages in the "functional equivalent" of police
questioning, 2 5 since the doctor was chosen by the police after the child had been taken
into protective custody. However, Wright could ultimately be reaffirmed as requiring a
reliability check for nontestimonial hearsay, although dicta in Davis challenges this
result.26 Another possibility would be to interpret Wright as affirming the interpretation
of Brasier that asserts that the statement of an incompetent child cannot be introduced
at trial. The child in Wright was only two and a half years old when the statement was
made, and three years at the time of trial. The judge concluded and the parties agreed
that she was "not capable of communicating to the jury,"27 which rendered her
incompetent. White can be distinguished because the child was slightly older, and the
trial court did not issue any decision about her competency or unavailability.
28
I believe the Supreme Court, like the majority of appellate courts, would reject
interpreting the objective observer standard from the perspective of a child of similar
age. As State v. Snowden29 found, this would insulate "statements by a young child
made in an environment and under circumstances in which the investigators clearly
contemplated use of the statements at a later trial."3 The Davis test, which focuses on
the interrogation, accords with this conclusion even though the Court muddies its
24. See generally Robert P. Mosteller, The Maturation and Disintegration of the Hearsay
Exception for Statements for Medical Examination in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 65 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 47 (2002) (discussing interpretation of medical exceptions as applied to
children).
25. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004).
26. See Myma S. Raeder, Domestic Violence Cases After Davis: Is the Glass HalfEmpty or
Half Full?, 15 BROOK. J.L. & POL'Y (forthcoming 2007) [hereinafter Domestic Violence Cases].
27. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 809 (1990) (quoting trial record).
28. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 344, 350 (1992).
29. 867 A.2d 314 (Md. 2005).
30. Id. at 329; cf Commonwealth v. DeOliveira, 849 N.E.2d 218, 225-26 (Mass. 2006)
(finding statement nontestimonial because child understood question was medical; questioning
whether "the Supreme Court would indorse a rule of such encompassing latitude").
1012 [Vol. 82:1009
2007] CHILD ABUSE LITIGATION IN A "TESTIMONIAL " WORLD
analysis in a footnote that indicated ultimately that the declarant's statements, and not
the questions, are key to the analysis.
31
Of course, just as I do not believe that all child hearsay is admissible, I also do not
believe the other extreme-signified by Brasier-that no child hearsay is admissible.
The child's cry in Brasier was after the event, when the child returned home, and as
Justice Scalia opined in Crawford, "to the extent the hearsay exception for spontaneous
declarations existed at all, it required that the statements be made 'immediat[ely] upon
the hurt received.' 32 Thus, the child's outcry would not have fit the 1791 excited
utterance exception, and therefore, even a restrictive interpretation of Brasier does not
preclude the admissibility of excited utterances made by incompetent witnesses.
Moreover, if child hearsay could not be admitted, Crawford's questioning of White
would not have been limited to statements made to the police. In other words, by
implication, Crawford suggests the remainder of the child's statements made to her
mother, babysitter, nurse, and doctor were admissible as nontestimonial, rather than
simply inadmissible, given the child's young age (four years when the statements were
made, five at trial).33 In addition, some of the statements implicitly approved in White
were statements admitted under a medical hearsay exception, signifying that either the
child in White was presumed competent, or that competency is not required for that
exception.
II. COMPETENCY IN A TESTIMONIAL WORLD
Professor Lyon, whose research about children is empirical as well as scholarly,
34
has come to the eminently sensible conclusion that we should be flexible about child
competency in order to ensure the admission of statements of young children.35
However, care must be taken in not reading too much into the Old Bailey cases that
appear to be generous in finding children competent, both because of the relative rarity
of child witness cases at the time, and, more importantly, the fact that most of the
children were of an age that in today's world would not even raise a question about
their competency.36 Obviously, the reason for incompetency is significant, since the
inability to discern truth from falsity cannot be immediately fixed, while the failure to
communicate with the jury often can. As Professor Lyon suggests, programs that
expose children to the courtroom, explain what will happen to them in developmentally
appropriate terminology, and sensitize lawyers and judges to questions that are age
appropriate, may substantially reduce the latter type of disqualification.
37
31. See Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2274 & n.1 (2006).
32. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 58 n.8. (2004) (citing Thompson v. Trevanion,
Skin. 402, 90 Eng. Rep. 179 (K.B. 1693)); see also Lyon & LaMagna, History of Children's
Hearsay, supra note 2, at 1053 (concluding that Brasier established an unavailability
requirement for child hearsay; admitting a child's statement if it was the best evidence that a
party could offer in child rape and assault prosecutions).
33. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 344, 349-50 (1992).
34. See, e.g., Thomas D. Lyon, Child Witnesses and the Oath: Empirical Evidence, 73 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1017, 1022 (2000) [hereinafter Lyon, Child Witnesses].





I have always been ambivalent about completely eliminating the oath, as a handful
of states permit, when children testify about their own abuse.38 However, several
judges who have let very young children testify have told me that they consider this
essential so that jurors can gauge the child's demeanor if the judge has admitted the
child's hearsay. I had not previously realized that this view could be traced as far back
as Lord Hale who urged that children be heard without an oath, since the adults that
repeated their statements may falsify or misrepresent them. 39 My qualms arise from
wondering whether the jury learns enough from viewing a young child like a frightened
doe caught in a car's headlights to offset both the potential trauma to the child and the
illusion that mere presence completely satisfies the defendant's confrontation concerns.
However, it may serve both sides to have otherwise incompetent children called simply
to be asked questions about competency, assuming that the child could be shielded
pursuant to Maryland v. Craig,40 if necessary. Of course, some children still might be
deemed unavailable for this practice if shielding cannot alleviate their trauma.
The result would be similar to that of having a defendant try on an article of
clothing, show a tattoo, or undertake some other act not considered testimonial. The
jurors would benefit by being able to evaluate the child, but no testimony would be
given concerning the crime that could raise testimonial concerns about the
effectiveness of cross-examination. In other words, it is unclear how many children
who are incompetent due to developmental concerns could answer enough questions
about the incident to satisfy the "opportunity for cross-examination." This approach
would only work when nontestimonial hearsay is being offered, since the opportunity
for cross-examination must exist for testimonial statements. However, the approach
may also provide a feasible compromise in cases involving testimonial statements
where the prosecution argues forfeiture because the child was warned not to disclose
the abuse.4'
To me, focusing on the term "oath" is a red herring. The modem trend also permits
affirmations. An oath has not been required if a child affirms that he or she will
"promise to tell the truth today," or "I won't tell a lie.'42 Similarly, the New Jersey
Supreme Court found it was sufficient to ask a five-year-old child who was testifying to
events that took place when she was three and a half whether or not she was going to
tell the truth or lie, rather than require an oath or acknowledgment that she understood
the obligation to testify truthfully and that she could face adverse consequences for
lying.43 I believe that courts are generally far too technical in determining competency;
that the insensitivity of lawyers and judges often causes the child's perceived
incompetency; that individual children can be competent even by age three;44 and that
38. See Lyon, Child Witnesses, supra note 34, at 1023.
39. 1 MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 634-35 (1736)
(Professional Books Ltd. 1971) (discussed in Mosteller, A Little Child ShallLead Them, supra
note 1, at 931).
40. 497 U.S. 836, 855 (1990).
41. See infra text accompanying notes 75-77.
42. In re Z.C., 2006 WL 2934264, 9 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 13, 2006); see FED. R. EVID.
603.
43. See State v. G.C., 902 A.2d 1174, 1182-83 (N.J. 2006).
44. See, e.g., Carole Peterson & Brenda Parsons, Interviewing Former 1-and 2- Year Olds
About Medical Emergencies 5 Years Later, 29 LAw & HuM. BEHAv. 743 (2005) (finding most
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adults often ask the wrong competency questions, thereby obtaining answers that do
not reveal the child's ability to meet the competency standard.4 5 But developmentally,
the testimony of most children who are under four will always be problematic unless in
addition to not requiring a showing of competency, the child can also respond to
questions about the incident, or, in the alternative, the statements are admitted due to
the defendant forfeiting the confrontation right.
Except for such very young children, in my view a more concerted effort to ensure
that children are comfortable in the courtroom, or can testify while shielded,46 will
permit prosecutors to avoid the testimonial ban and continue to introduce child
hearsay, including forensic interviews. Together with expert testimony and prior acts of
the defendant,47 this will bolster the credibility of children. However, I recognize that
defendants will argue that Crawford's reach extends beyond mere presence and oath-
taking to the opportunity for effective cross-examination.
III. EXPANDING THE APPLICATION OF CRAIG
If lack of competency is caused solely by the child's inability to communicate with
the jury, Maryland v. Craig49 provides the best solution. Craig permits children to
testify from a different location via some type of television arrangement, or simply to
be placed in the courtroom with a screening device, when particularized need is
demonstrated, showing that the child is fearful of testifying in the defendant's
presence. 50 Craig appears anathema to Crawford, which decried open-ended balancing
tests that "do violence" to "categorical constitutional guarantees." 51 However, State v.
Vogelsberg52 rejected a direct challenge to Craig, finding that had the Supreme Court
intended to overrule Craig, it would have done so explicitly. Vogelsberg distinguished
the confrontation issue raised by Crawford, which focuses on when confrontation is
required, from the issue raised by Craig, which addresses the procedures required in
regulating confrontation.53 It is also important to remember that the Craig approach to
former two-year-olds recalled a great deal); Hearsay Exceptions, supra note 5 (generally
discussing psychological literature concerning children).
45. See, e.g., Thomas D. Lyon, Karen J. Saywitz, Debra L. Kaplan & Joyce S. Dorado,
Reducing Maltreated Children's Reluctance to Answer Hypothetical Oath-Taking Competency
Questions, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHtAv. 81 (2001); see also Paul Wagland & Kay Bussey, Factors
that Facilitate and Undermine Children's Beliefs About Truth Telling, 29 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
639 (2005) (suggesting ways to facilitate truth telling by children who are afraid to speak after
adults have sworn them to secrecy).
46. See, e.g., ANN M. HARALAMBIE, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE IN CIVIL CASES: A GUIDE To
CUSTODY AND TORT ACTIONS 312-15 (1999); Lyon, Child Witnesses, supra note 34, at 1071.
47. See generally Myrna S. Raeder, Navigating Between Scylla and Charybdis: Ohio s
Efforts to Protect Children Without Eviscerating the Rights of Criminal Defendants-
Evidentiary Considerations and the Rebirth of Confrontation Clause Analysis in ChildAbuse
Cases, 25 U. TOL. L. REV. 43 (1994).
48. See infra text accompanying notes 78-103.
49. 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
50. Id. at 855.
51. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 67-68 (2004).
52. 749 N.W.2d 649 (Wis. App. 2006).
53. Id. at 654; cf United States v. Yates 438 F.3d 1307, 1313 (1 lth Cir. 2006) (applying
Craig, rather than Crawford, to confrontation via two-way television).
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confrontation can be traced to the 1895 decision in Mattox v. United States,54 which
makes it less subject to being overruled as a product of the Roberts rejected reliability
test. In addition, Craig has not produced the parade of horribles that Crawford so
dramatically portrayed as justification for jettisoning Roberts. Indeed, Craig has
provided a sensible solution for an intractable problem: providing cross-examination of
abused children who are traumatized.
A century earlier than Craig, Mattox recognized that "the rights of the public shall
not be wholly sacrificed in order that an incidental benefit may be preserved to the
accused,55 and that exceptions may arise from the "necessities of the case, and to
prevent a manifest failure of justice., 56 1 have argued elsewhere that Mattox's time-
honored balancing test would also better serve societal interests than complete
exclusion of most critical testimonial statements that cannot be duplicated at trial, when
the police have not created the statement and the government is not negligent or at fault
in failing to provide prior cross-examination. 7 Even without such an approach, the
flexibility offered by Craig should allow most children who are now disqualified
because of communication problems to testify.
Freezing on the witness stand is something that can be cured. The judicial branch
should take responsibility for ensuring that children are treated appropriately in court.
Federal and state rules not only give judges the ability to control the nature of
questions posed to children to avoid harassment, but also to take measures to make
children comfortable in the courtroom.5 8 Education should be required for judges and
lawyers who interact with children in the courtroom, and the use of experts identified
by the court to interview children and make recommendations about their competency
should be mandated. Many prosecutors attempt to familiarize children with the
courtroom and testifying; this should be a standard practice. Specialized child abuse
courts should be created in urban locations, similar to domestic violence courts that
have helped to increase successful prosecutions and assist victims. Just as victim
advocates are now commonplace in domestic violence cases, they should be available
to help children and their families cope with the trial process in child abuse cases.
Prosecutors now have greater incentive to have children testify because testimonial
statements can no longer be introduced without the child present, making it likely that
even without doctrinal changes, resort to Craig will become more popular.
Undoubtedly, Craig is not a complete panacea since the child must be "traumatized,
not by the courtroom generally, but by the presence of the defendant." 59 Thus several
cases have reversed where dual reasons for the fear existed.6 ° Similarly, courts vary
significantly about the nature and extent of the showing that justifies in-court
54. 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
55. Id. at 243.
56. Id. at 244 (discussing dying declarations).
57. Myma S. Raeder, Confrontation Clause Analysis After Davis, 22 CRIM. JUSTICE 10, 15
(Spring 2007).
58. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3509 (2000).
59. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 856 (1990).
60. See, e.g., United States v. Bordeaux, 400 F.3d 548, 553-54 (8th Cir. 2005) (post-
Crawford) (also noting confrontation via a two-way closed circuit television is not
constitutionally equivalent to face-to-face confrontation); United States v. Turning Bear, 357
F.3d 730, 736 (8th Cir. 2004) (pre-Crawford).
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regulation of testimony, as well as who can establish it.61 Some judges have permitted
prosecutors to make the representation concerning trauma, although one well-respected
commentator has recommended that the judge talk to the child.62 Pre-Crawford,
Justices Scalia and Thomas have dissented from the denial of certiorari in two cases
involving interpretation of Craig that they characterized as "confrontation-via-TV.
63
In one, a fifteen-year-old teenager indicated she was not afraid of the defendant, but
"can't be near him.''64 The other protected a child whose mother and doctor indicated
that the six-year-old wanted to testify, and because the testimony would be limited to
another girl's abuse, not her own, neither expected the child to suffer additional
emotional distress.
65
Since Davis has approved an approach to confrontation based on "primary
purpose, 66 this standard should also satisfy Craig when the child's fear is "primarily"
based on testifying in front of the defendant. Ultimately, I do not expect Craig's
balancing approach to be vanquished; not only because it can be distinguished as
regulating in-court testimony, rather than out-of-court statements, but also because it
appears to embody a forfeiture approach appropriate to children. In other words, the
standard basically acts as a presumption that the child's fear is caused by the
defendant, based on the reality that a large proportion of molested children are told not
to reveal their abuse and that these children are effectively powerless in the presence of
an adult, particularly, as Professor Lyon suggests, an adult who resides at home or is a
trusted family member or friend.67 Thus, Craig's elimination of any evidentiary
requirement that the defendant actually threatened the child not to testify is rationally
based.
Ironically, proof of forfeiture in a testimonial context, which requires a showing of
acts directed towards witness tampering, would permit the hearsay to be admitted
without the child's testimony, completely defeating cross-examination that is essential
to the application of Craig as well as to the defendant's right to a fair trial. Craig is
critical because it allows both cross-examination of testimonial statements and the
jury's evaluation of children without unduly exposing them to potential trauma.68 I
61. See, e.g., State v. Marlyn J.J., 2007 WL 610938, at 46-53 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 1,
2007) (testimony of therapist in combination with evidence that child was so frightened at
preliminary hearing that she had to be removed from courtroom was sufficient); State v.
Paulson, 2007 WL 461323, at *6 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 14, 2007) (trained child abuse
investigator's conclusion that child would be traumatized by testifying in the presence of the
defendant was sufficient).
62. See Jean Montoya, Lessons from Akiki and Michaels on Shielding Child Witnesses, 1
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 340, 342-43, 356-66 (1995).
63. Marx v. Texas, 528 U.S. 1034, 1034-38 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting), denying cert. to
987 S.W.2d 577(Tex. Crim. App. 1999), aff'g 953 S.W.2d 321 (Tex. App. 1997).
64. Danner v. Kentucky, 525 U.S. 1010, 1010 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting), denying cert.
to 963 S.W.2d 632 (Ky. 1998).
65. Marx, 528 U.S. at 1034-38.
66. Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2268 (2006).
67. See Lyon & LaMagna, History of Children's Hearsay, supra note 2.
68. The extent to which children are traumatized by testifying is not settled. See, e.g., 1
JOHN E.B. MYERS, MYERS ON EVIDENCE IN CHILD, DOMESTIC AND ELDER ABUSE CASES § 3.01,at
134-41 (3d ed. 2005) (discussing psychological research); John E.B. Myers, The Child Sexual
Abuse Literature: A Call for Greater Objectivity, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1709, 1724 (1990)
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agree with Professor Lyon that jurors want to see the children on whose hearsay they
must rely to convict the defendant. Moreover, prosecutors have difficulty winning
cases without them, and some suggest that prosecutors are loath to indict a defendant
when the child cannot testify.
69
The apparent downside to Craig is that empirical data appear to suggest that when
children are shielded, the jury may find the child less credible, even though their
reliability increases. 70 Therefore, in cases applying Craig, the prosecution should be
permitted to admit expert testimony that shielding does not lower child witness
reliability, to counteract this non-intuitive finding. It may be more difficult to argue in
favor of expert testimony that shielding enhances credibility, as not sufficiently vetted
by Daubert,71 or as improper vouching. However, insinuations by the defense that the
child's shielding lowers her credibility should be considered as opening the door for
such expertise.
Finally, I think it is doctrinally appropriate to require a two-step process before
introducing hearsay of a nontestifying child. In other words, a child should be required
to testify via the protections offered by Craig before permitting the child's hearsay in
absence of his or her testimony. If the prosecution demonstrates that Craig would not
alleviate the trauma, then the child's statements would be introduced subject to
Crawford and Davis. While White might seem at odds with this approach, Crawford
made clear that White is suspect. 72 Certainly, as to testimonial statements, a child who
could testify protected by Craig should not be considered unavailable, which renders
her statements inadmissible, even if forfeiture could be argued. In other words, Craig
should trump forfeiture if the child can testify when shielded. If the Court expands the
definition of testimonial to include many medical and forensic statements as I argue
below, shielding under Craig would no doubt become more widely demanded by
prosecutors to ensure the admissibility of testimonial hearsay.
While I recognize that some prosecutors believe that court proceedings re-
traumatize children, the experts in the field do not necessarily agree. Given the
protections of shielding and programs to familiarize children with courtroom
procedures, if the choice is between letting a dangerous abuser escape without trial or
having the child testify, it is the psychologist and/or judge who has talked to the child
who should be relied upon to make the final decision in an individual case. Conversely,
although I urge the expanded use of Craig, care must be taken that statutory schemes
enacted by some states do not become a trap for defendants who may lose their right to
(challenging the stereotype that claims "[flor most victims, confrontation with the legal system
is a second and separate trauma, a process of revictimization"); Gail D. Cecchettini-Whaley,
Note, Children as Witnesses after Maryland v. Craig, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 1993 (1992) (surveying
psychological literature).
69. John E.B. Myers, Allison D. Redlich, Gail S. Goodman & Lori P. Prizmich, Jurors'
Perceptions of Hearsay in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 388, 411
(1999) (finding that children testified live in court in each trial studied, which suggested that
"prosecutors are reluctant to take child sexual abuse cases to trial unless the victim is available
to testify").
70. See Jean Montoya, David Ross & Louise Graham, Child Witness Policy: Law
Interfacing with Social Science, 65 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 209, 238-39 (2002).
71. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); see also FED. R. Evin. 702.
72. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 58 n.8 (2004).
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cross-examination through invited error or waiver, such as when they do not
specifically ask for the child to be interviewed or testify at trial.
73
As to nontestimonial statements, while I believe that Craig should also be required
before admitting the hearsay of a child who does not testify, it is unlikely that this
would be mandated under the current confrontation clause approach. However, under a
robust view of due process, resort to Craig would appear a sensible compromise in
keeping with historic concerns about child testimony. Certainly the compulsory process
right of the defendant would compel the same result. However, because the child
would be called as a defense witness, adverse strategic consequences might occur. For
example, the direct would actually be in the form of cross-examination, appearing to
the jury as if the child is being intimidated, as well as potentially eliciting evidence that
is damaging to the defense. For a number of years, Minnesota has, when requested by
the defense, required prosecutors to call available child witnesses in their case-in-chief
when child hearsay is being admitted against the defendant.74 While adoption of this
procedure was not constitutionally based, it provides a model that should be more
widely enacted.
IV. FORFEITURE IN CHILD ABUSE CASES
Forfeiture can also play a direct role in child abuse cases when the evidence
establishes the defendant's misconduct. However, tracing the misconduct to the
defendant is not always simple when the defendant is a family member, because the
child is often pressured not to testify by the non-offending parent, typically the mother.
This occurs because the abuse may result in the mother having to make a choice of
living with her male intimate and having her child removed from the home, or giving
up the male to retain custody of her child. Because the penalties for child abuse are so
great, on occasion the family refuses to believe the child. Similarly, children who are
old enough to understand the ramifications of making the complaint may recognize at
some point that they would rather live at home than be placed in foster care. Another
significant forfeiture problem is that the intimidation is not necessarily directed toward
not testifying, but rather to keeping the relationship a secret, or preventing original
disclosure.75
73. See Morales v. State, No. 13-05-188-CR, 2006 WL 3234073 (Tex. App. Nov. 9,2006)
(defendant could have submitted written interrogatories to the unavailable child whose
videotape was permitted, or asked for an interview via closed circuit television at time of trial;
admission of other videotapes was invited error); accord Rangel v. State, 199 S.W.3d 523, 537
(Tex. App. 2006) (defendant had opportunity to effectively cross-examine child through
submission of written interrogatories to neutral interrogator after viewing videotaped
statements).
74. See State v. Larson, 472 N.W.2d 120, 125 (Minn. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1071
(1992).
75. See Tom Harbinson, Using the Crawford v. Washington "Forfeiture by Wrongdoing"
Confrontation Clause Exception in Child Abuse Cases, REASONABLE EFFORTs (Am.





Most thoughtful commentators are concerned that forfeiture doctrine should not be
interpreted so broadly in a child context that it routinely allows testimonial hearsay
when the child does not take the stand. However, this concern must be balanced against
the possibility that most of the child's statements will be excluded, rendering it
virtually impossible to obtain a conviction in many cases. Craig may also play a part in
resolving this tension. If the child can testify shielded pursuant to Craig, then forfeiture
should not trump the giving of testimony. If, however, the child would still be
traumatized and unable to testify, then the original threats to the child should be
presumed to affect the child's inability to testify at trial under a forfeiture rationale
even though the demonstrated tampering occurred prior to disclosure. In other words,
forfeiture is not simply based on the defendant's choosing a highly vulnerable young
child who may be incompetent to testify, 76 but rather on the defendant's actions that
were aimed at defeating the judicial system. Indeed, some refusals and recantations
occur because the defendant, or those acting with his acquiescence, continue to
intimidate the child, who is unwilling to admit that the defendant is responsible.
I have also reconsidered my initial view that if children are too young to meet their
truth-telling obligation, the defendant's coercion does not supply a direct link to
witness tampering at trial. On further reflection, forfeiture should also apply in this
situation because this rationale is not dependent on reliability or waiver, rather on
misconduct. Thus, the defendant's instructions not to disclose the abuse supplies the
intent necessary to demonstrate eventual witness tampering,77 and the defendant should
not benefit by the fortuity of the child being incompetent.
V. OPPORTUNITY FOR CROSS-EXAMINING CHILD WITNESSES
Permitting the child abuse victim to testify, whether shielded or without regard to
traditional measures of competency, does not necessarily eliminate the testimonial bar.
Courts disagree about the extent to which cross-examination of an incompetent child
poses a confrontation problem.78 Moreover, despite Owens79and Green,80 which reject
confrontation challenges for declarants who testify, defendants have rushed to attack
the testimony of children by claiming their opportunity for cross-examination was not
adequate. They rely heavily on United States v. Spotted War Bonnet, 81 a pre-Crawford
opinion, finding that if"a child is so young that she cannot be cross-examined at all, or
if she is 'simply too young and too frightened to be subjected to a thorough direct or
76. See State v. Henderson, 129 P.3d 646, 655 (Kan. Ct. App. 2006) (rejecting forfeiture
where no misconduct was cited, but simply the age of the three-year-old child).
77. See generally James F. Flanagan, Confrontation, Equity, and the Misnamed Exception
for "Forfeiture" by Wrongdoing, 14 WM. &MARY BILLRTS. J. 1193 (2006).
78. Compare Walters v. McCormick, 122 F.3d 1172,1175 (9th Cir. 1997) (pre-Crawford
the "[i]ncapacity to understand the duty to testify truthfully does not automatically offend the
Confrontation Clause when the witness in question is a young child") with Purvis v. State, 829
N.E.2d 572, 581 (2005) (developmentally disabled child who was unable to appreciate the
obligation to testify truthfully could not be effectively cross-examined for Crawford purposes
concerning testimonial statements; upholding the admission of nontestimonial statements).
79. United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554 (1988).
80. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
81. 933 F.2d 1471 (8th Cir. 1991).
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cross-examination[,]' the fact that she is physically present in the courtroom should
not, in and of itself, satisfy the demands of the Clause. 8 2 Most courts reject claims that
imperfect memory 3 or failure to respond to a handful of questions8 4 renders a child
unavailable. A few decisions go further, finding a child available who did not
remember what she told adults or even what the defendant did to her, but where she
said she told the adults the truth, which permitted the admission of her videotaped
statements to a social worker and deputy that included graphic descriptions of the
abuse.s 5 Moreover, forgoing cross-examination about specifics of the alleged abuse
after a child fails to respond on direct to the details of the abuse can result in a waiver
of the cross-examination issue,8 6 as can failing to recall a child after her videotaped
statement is introduced.
8 7
Yet, several post-Crawford cases have found Confrontation Clause violations
despite the child's presence at trial for reasons including improper limitation of cross-
examination.88 For example, In re T. T.89 found a child was unavailable to testify after
she froze on the stand when asked to recount the alleged incidents of abuse.90 Although
the child responded to general questions from the prosecutor about her family and
school, and explained how she came to be at the alleged perpetrator's house on the
dates of the alleged assaults, when questions became more specific regarding the
assaults, she stopped answering questions, even after a recess was taken so that her
mother could console her.91 Similarly, in People v. Osio, 92 the child's preliminary
hearing testimony to only one of seven counts provided insufficient opportunity for
82. Id. at 1474 (quoting United States v. Dorian, 803 F.2d 1439, 1446 (8th Cir. 1986)).
83. People v. Harless, 22 Cal. Rptr. 3d 625,637 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (partial failure did not
prevent witness from explaining prior statements or preclude assessment of her demeanor by
jury); State v. McClanahan, No. 50866-1-I, 2004 WL 723283, at *4 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 5,
2004) (second grader subjected to substantial cross-examination).
84. State v. McKinney, 699 N.W.2d 471, 480 (S.D. 2005).
85. State v. Yanez, No. A04-276, 2005 WL 894649, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 19,2005);
see also State v. Price, 110 P.3d 1171, 1175 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (admitting child's
statements made to her mother and a detective despite child's testimony that she remembered
neither the abuse nor making the statements).
86. See People v. Sharp, 825 N.E.2d 706, 713 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
87. See Brown v. State, No. CACR 05-1409, 2006 WL 2501416 (Ark. Ct. App. Aug. 30,
2006); Penny v. State, No. 2005-KA-01543-COA, 2006 WL 3593220 (Miss. Ct. App. Dec. 12,
2006) (both finding waiver).
88. E.g., People v. Couturier, No. 252175, 2005 WL 323680 at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 10,
2005) (limiting the cross-examination of a child witness at trial concerning questions about
notes she wrote to the defendant after the alleged abuse saying she loved and missed him
violated the defendant's right of confrontation where there was no corroborating physical
evidence or witness testimony), vacated, 704 N.W.2d 463 (Mich. 2005), rev'd, 2005 WL
3439824 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 2005) (court stated it believed error had been preserved and
was reversible, but under plain error standard mandated by the Michigan Supreme Court, it
affirmed the judgment).
89. 815 N.E.2d 789 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
90. Id. at 797-98.
91. Id.
92. No. H026953, 2005 WL 1231402 (Cal. Ct. App. May 25, 2005).
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cross-examination. 93 Indeed, care must be taken that preliminary hearings or other
pretrial depositions or procedures provide an adequate opportunity for cross-
examination when the child does not testify at trial.94
Given the intensive fact-driven nature of such appeals, it is difficult to predict how
broadly the opportunity for cross-examination will be interpreted concerning children.
I agree with Professor Mosteller that we must accommodate these less-than-perfect
witnesses. 95 Both a total lack of recall, and a feigned lack of recall, were sufficient for
confrontation purposes in Owens and Green respectively. The rationale that the jury
could assess credibility and that the witness was impeached by lack of recollection is
the same whether the witness is an adult or a child. Therefore, unlike State v.
Brigman,96 where young children were found unavailable where they remembered
telling their foster parents what the defendant had done, but not what happened, their
lack of memory should not render them unavailable in the absence of some other bar to
competency. 97 In other words, children should not be disadvantaged by a higher
standard than an adult would be required to meet. Thus, the appropriate judicial
response is found in State v. Carothers,98 where the court noted that although the child
may not have been able to repeat exactly what she told the social worker, police
officers, or doctors, "she did remember speaking to them and responded that she
remembered telling... 'the truth.' 99
Likewise, it is wrong to declare a child unavailable simply because of her lack of
memory, resulting in the appellate court reversing because of the admission of her
forensic interview, when there is no clear indication of her incompetency.100 Bockting
v. Bayer l l raised the interesting question of whether a child must take the stand to
testify to lack of memory. Bockting held that admission of a child's hearsay statement
to a detective warranted habeas relief where the statement was critical in view of the
victim's testimony at the preliminary hearing claiming not to remember what
93. Id. at *7.
94. See Remember the Ladies, supra note 8, at 355-58. Compare Howard v. State, 853
N.E.2d 461, 468-69 (Ind. 2006) (extensive discovery deposition of child provided sufficient
prior opportunity to cross-examine child) with State v. Noah, No. 91353, 2006 WL 1976505 at
*1 (Kan. Ct. App. July 14, 2006) (brief preliminary hearing did not provide sufficient prior
opportunity to cross-examine child), review granted, Dec. 19, 2006.
95. See Mosteller, A Little Child Shall Lead Them, supra note 1, at 990 & n.283.
96. 632 S.E.2d 498 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006).
97. Id. at 506. In Brigman, given that the victims were two years old, their ability to discem
the truth may have been an issue, but it was not discussed and the children clearly
communicated with the judge at the hearing. The court admitted their statements under the
dubious rationale that a reasonable child under three years of age would not know that his
statements might later be used at trial. Id.
98. 724 N.W.2d 610 (S.D. 2006).
99. Id. at618.
100. See State v. Blue, 717 N.W.2d 558, 560, 565 (N.D. 2006) (finding a child's mere
presence at preliminary hearing not sufficient opportunity for cross-examination, where child
shook her head to answer questions, and no questions were asked by defendant; trial judge
declared her unavailable due to lack of memory).
101. 399 F.3d 1010, amended by 408 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2005), rev'don other grounds sub
nom. Whorton v. Bockting, 127 S. Ct. 1173, 1177 (2007).
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happened. 0 2 However, the Supreme Court recently reversed on the ground that
Crawford is not retroactive, 103 not resolving the underlying issue in cases reviewed on
direct appeal. Obviously, the multiple variations of how this issue is raised will impact
the ability to provide uniform guidance, but generally courts should be generous in
finding competency, and applying Owens.
VI. MEDICAL EXCEPTIONS AND MULTIDISCIPLINARY FORENSIC TEAMS
Crawford appears to doom the use of multidisciplinary teams in child abuse as a
way of introducing statements of children who do not testify. This approach has been
encouraged by the Department of Justice for the last ten years as a way to include
"[s]ocial workers, physicians, therapists, prosecutors, judges, and police officers"'1 4 to
limit the amount of questioning of children and encourage their appropriate
questioning. More than forty states have legislation concerning joint investigation and
cooperation between law enforcement and social services and authorizing
multidisciplinary teams.1
0 5
Such teams have been instrumental in improving the skills of interviewers and
reducing the number of interviews. 0 6 Now Crawford has turned these best practices
into a textbook for creating testimonial statements when the child does not testify. As
Professor Mosteller suggested in his oral presentation at the Association of American
Law Schools (AALS), merely using the word forensic ensures finding a statement or
videotaped interview is testimonial. 0 7 While a few outlying cases treat some
videotaped statements as given primarily for nonprosecutorial purposes, 08 most agree
with United States v. Bordeaux109 that because the statements may also have "a medical
purpose does not change the fact that they were testimonial, because Crawford does
not indicate, and logic does not dictate, that multipurpose statements cannot be
102. 399 F.3d at 1022.
103. Bockting, 127 S. Ct. at 1177.
104. OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LAW
ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE To CtmLD ABUSE 3 (2d prtg. 2001), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles/162425.pdf.
105. Nat'l Dist. Attorneys Ass'n, Legislation Mandating or Authorizing the Creation of
Multidisciplinary/Multi-Agency Child Protection Teams (Nov. 5, 2004), http://www.ndaa-
apri.org/pdf/statutes legislation mandatingmultidisciplinary teams_2004.pdf.
106. See, e.g., John E.B. Myers, Karen J. Saywitz & Gail S. Goodman, Psychological
Research on Children as Witnesses: Practical Implications for Forensic Interviews and
Courtroom Testimony, 28 PAC. L.J. 3, 17 (1996).
107. See Robert P. Mosteller, Address at the Association of American Law Schools Annual
Meeting Symposium: Children as Witnesses: Competence, Hearsay, and Confrontation (Jan. 4,
2007), available at http://www3.cali.org/aalsO7/mp3/AALS%202007%20Children%20and%20
Evidence%20Law/o2020070104.mp3.
108. See State v. Scacchetti, 711 N.W.2d 508, 515 (Minn. 2006) (pre-Davis; holding
pediatric nurse's purpose in evaluating victim was to assess her medical condition, and mere fact
that nurse might be called to testify did not transform medical purpose of assessments into a
prosecutorial purpose); see also State v. Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d 243, 254-55 (Minn. 2006)
(avoiding multiple interviews is a critical concern; statutory scheme requiring taping protects
health and welfare of children).
109. 400 F.3d 548 (8th Cir. 2005).
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testimonial."1 10 In other words, the focus is on whether law enforcement is its primary
motivation.'1 '
Post-Davis, more courts rely on the "primary purpose" of the interview. For
example, in State v. Justus,'12 the Supreme Court of Missouri held a child's statements
were testimonial when made to a child investigator for the division of family services,
and a social worker for a children's advocacy center who videotaped the interview." 3
The court found the statements were made in a formal setting, that the four-year-old
child was aware the statements could be used against her father, and that the primary
purpose was to establish or prove past events, even though another purpose of the
interrogations was to assist the child. 14 Although the mother and grandmother also
testified to the statements, the court did not find the error harmless, and reversed the
conviction. 115 Similarly, State v. Pitt16 found plain error where the trial judge admitted
a videotaped interview taken at a county child advocacy center for the purpose of
furthering a police investigation, or in the words they quoted from Davis, "their
primary purpose was to 'establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later
criminal prosecution.""'17
Professor Mosteller has thoroughly reviewed all of the existing post-Crawford cases
concerning statements to medical personnel, finding remarkable consistency in
holdings by lower courts, once the categories are sufficiently parsed to take account of
the role of law enforcement in obtaining the statements." 8 In other words, while some
courts find statements to social workers or medical personnel in child advocacy centers
to be testimonial, most statements to medical personnel are admitted as nontestimonial,
even on occasion, statements to nurse practitioners in units whose mission is to assist
law enforcement.' 19 Some courts stress that "[tihe key to the inquiry is whether the
examination and questioning were for a 'diagnostic purpose' and whether the
'statement was the by-product of substantive medical activity.' 120 Under this
110. Id. at 556.
111. See id. (forensic interviews are connected with courtroom use; questioning is formal for
law enforcement purposes, despite its multipurpose use for medical assistance).
112. 205 S.W.3d 872 (Mo. 2006) (en banc).
113. Id. at874.
114. Id. at880-81.
115. Id. at 881.
116. 147 P.3d 940 (Or. Ct. App. 2006).
117. Id. at 945 (quoting Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2273 (2006)).
118. See Mosteller, A Little Child Shall Lead Them, supra note 1, at 944-65; see also
Remember the Ladies, supra note 8, at 377-83.
119. Compare State v. Stahl, 855 N.E.2d 834, 844 (Ohio 2006) (statements made by adult
rape victim to nurse practitioner during an emergency-room examination at unit of hospital
specializing in treating sexual assault victims, in which victim identified defendant as her
assailant, were not testimonial despite fact that unit's mission statement listed one of its primary
purposes as assisting law enforcement, since this was secondary to care of its patients) with State
v. Krasky, 721 N.W.2d 916, 922 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (rejecting statement to nurse
practitioner when child's health and welfare are no longer at risk and the interview investigates
past events).
120. State v. Kirby, 908 A.2d 506, 527 (Conn. 2006) (quoting In re T.T., 351 N.E.2d 789,
803 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004)); see also Allie Phillips, Health Care Providers'Roles After Crawford,
Davis & Hammon, 40 PROSECUTOR 18, 21 (2006) (suggesting doctors emphasize their medical
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formulation most statements are deemed nontestimonial, 2' despite the reality that each
of the fifty states has enacted mandatory reporting of child abuse laws that affect the
medical personnel and social workers that a child would be likely to approach,
including a number of states that require any person who suspects abuse to report it to
the proper authorities.' 22 While many courts have ignored this issue, which I find
completely disingenuous, a few judges have started to question why mandatory
reporting is not a significant factor in analyzing the nature of the statement.'23
When the testimonial approach is interpreted restrictively, the result basically
duplicates the hearsay routinely admitted pursuant to White. Beyond the involvement
of medical personnel with law enforcement, which explains much of the variation as to
whether statements are testimonial, another distinction that has arisen relates to
identifying the perpetrator or attributing fault.12 4 I have always questioned why a
statement by a child abuse victim, which attributes fault to a member of the victim's
immediate household, should be admitted under the medical exception. However,
many states view such statements as relevant to the prevention of recurrence of injury
to the child.125 Therefore, I am not troubled that such statements would likely be
suppressed under a true testimonial approach that focuses on the accusatory nature of
statements, although some courts are still admitting identity as nontestimonial.
126
Unlike Professor Mosteller, I would not permit identity under medical exceptions; yet I
do agree with him that the answer cannot be based on differing state hearsay policies,
but must be decided as a unitary Confrontation Clause issue. 127 To me, identity is
essentially a child safety issue that is inextricably intertwined with a law-enforcement
purpose dwarfing any nonprosecutorial function.
If mandatory reporting is taken seriously, more traditional symptoms and
descriptions of medical problems would be transformed into testimonial statements
unless courts view the accusation narrowly to include only the identification of the
perpetrator, as opposed to explaining the nature of the injuries caused. The court
adopted this distinction in In re T T.,128 which found statements to be nontestimonial
where they did not accuse or identify the perpetrator of the assault, such as the child's
explanation of how she was penetrated, descriptions of the pain, and the offender's use
services to children when testifying).
121. See State v. Slater, 908 A.2d 1097, 1106-07 (Conn. 2006) (adult victim; surveys case-
law); see also Remember the Ladies, supra note 8, at 377-79.
122. NAT'L CLEARINGHOUSE ON CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT INFO., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., CURRENT TRENDS IN CHILD MALTREATMENT REPORTING LAWS 1 (2002).
123. See, e.g, State v. Hosty, 944 So. 2d 255, 269-70 (Fla. 2006) (Quince, J., dissenting
from holding that statements to teacher were not testimonial because Florida teachers are legally
obligated to report any crimes that occur when students are under the district school board's
jurisdiction).
124. See Slater, 908 A.2d at 1106-07 (discussing case-law).
125. State v. Sims, 890 P.2d 521, 523 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995); Blake v. State, 933 P.2d 474,
477 n.2 (Wyo. 1997) ("[A]n overwhelming majority ofjurisdictions, including at least thirty-
two states and four federal circuits, allow into evidence statements regarding the identity of the
perpetrator in child physical or sexual assault cases.").
126. See, e.g., United States v. Peneaux, 432 F.3d 882, 896 (8th Cir. 2005) (identification
admitted; "Where statements are made to a physician seeking to give medical aid in form of
diagnosis or treatment, they are presumptively nontestimonial.").
127. See Mosteller, A Little Child Shall Lead Them, supra note 1.
128. 815 N.E.2d 789, 804 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
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of a lubricant. While I would expect the defense bar to argue that statements to all
mandatory reporters are testimonial, an absolute ban on all statements made to medical
personnel concerning child abuse would be quite troubling. Looking to the nature of
the statement appears more in keeping with Davis when the physician is not part of a
prosecutorial forensic team or otherwise motivated to obtain an accusatory statement.
VII. OTHER STATEMENTS TO PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS
So far, the Court has rejected an accusatorial approach, which would be more likely
to make statements to private individuals testimonial. Lower courts agree. For
example, People v. R.F. 129 issued a blanket holding that statements of a child to family
members are not testimonial.1 30 Similarly, in People v. Griffin, the California Supreme
Court noted that a child victim's statements to a friend at school were not
testimonial.13' Purvis v. State132 found that the fact that parents turn over information
about crimes to the police "does not transform their interactions with their children intopolice investigations." 133 Moreover, foster parents have not been considered agents of
the state for purposes of determining if a statement is testimonial.1 34 Given the
tendency of many courts to treat statements to private individuals as nontestimonial, a
significant amount of child hearsay will still be admissible because family members are
typically the ones to whom abuse is originally disclosed, making the question of
harmless error for duplicative information a major issue. This tendency also raises the
issue of whether Wright requires a reliability check for statements admitted under child
hearsay or residual exceptions, which I have argued elsewhere that it should.
35
CONCLUSION
Advocates on behalf of abused children must adjust to the testimonial world, rather
than fighting it by strained interpretations that generally lower their credibility when
making claims that courts are more likely to accept. The focus should be on using
Craig to allow more children to testify, coupled with a concerted effort both to educate
129. 825 N.E.2d 287 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
130. Id. at 295; see also State v. Aaron L., 865 A.2d 1135, 1146 n.21 (Conn. 2005) (finding
a statement of a two-and-a-half-year-old victim to mother was not testimonial); Herrera-Vega v.
State, 888 So. 2d 66, 69 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (finding a spontaneous statement of three-
year-old child to mother was not testimonial, nor was repetition of that statement to father
minutes later).
131. 93 P.3d 344, 372 n.19 (Cal. 2004).
132. 829 N.E.2d 572 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1580 (2006).
133. Id. at 579; see also People v. Learn, No. 2-04-1169,2007 WL 724835 at * 14 (111. App.
Ct. 2007) (special concurrence of Presiding Justice Grometer suggested reasonable parents face
an ongoing emergency in learning the identity of the abuser so that they can deny access to the
child and protect their wellbeing).
134. United States v. Peneaux, 432 F.3d 882, 896 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 127 S.Ct. 42
(2006).
135. Remember the Ladies, supra note 8, at 320-25; Domestic Violence Cases, supra note
26.
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lawyers and judges about how to appropriately interact with children, and to make
children comfortable to testify in a courtroom setting.

